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Abstract: Self-evident warrants are self-backed and thus knowable a priori. Warrants licencing inferring a moral 
conclusion from a morally relevant premise are paradigm examples. Such warrants are defeasible, for example 
where there is a conflict of duties. Evidence for them involves moral intuition. Moral realism argues for the 
objectivity of such intuition and of defeasible a priori warrants. Warrant strength depends on how many rebuttals 
may be brought against a warrant and their plausibility. 
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1. Backing-introducing questions and self-evidence 
 
John promised to give Jane all the files concerning the case. Therefore John is morally obligated 
to give Jane the files. What is the warrant of this argument? Simplifying, we may state it this 
way:  
 From: x promised to give y to z 
   To infer ceteris paribus: x is morally obligated to give y to z 
 
Using Toulmin’s terminology, how is this warrant backed (1958, p. 103)? Why does this 
argument have authority or currency? (1958, p. 103)? Does this question seem otiose? One might 
wonder why from a substance x’s having properties P1  . . . , P.n., we may infer that x has Q. 
Seeing the connection might require observable evidence which thereby backs the warrant.  But 
need we find a body of evidence to back the warrant from having made a promise to having the 
moral obligation to keep it? Ross puts the point quite memorably: “To me it seems as self-evident 
as anything could be, that to make a promise ... is to create a moral claim on us in someone else” 
(Ross, 21 n, italics added). If the warrant is self-evident, then we do not need a separate body of 
backing evidence. We recognize the reliability of the warrant a priori. The warrant, however, is 
defeasible. The argument 
 
 James promised to return to John his (i.e. John’s) rifle. So 
 James is morally obligated to return to John his rifle. 
 
instances the same warrant. But suppose John shows clear signs of mental instability. His 
behavior strongly suggests that he can harm himself or others if James gives him his rifle. Is 
James still obligated to keep his promise? The inference, although self-evident, presupposes that 
all things are equal and, in this case, they are not. 
 We have argued for recognizing a class of defeasible a priori warrants in (Freeman, 2013a, 
pp. 35-39). Moral arguments from a non-moral but morally relevant premise to a normative 
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conclusion are paradigms. We are using “moral” broadly here to include intrinsic, deontic, and 
aretaic value. Two questions immediately arise. Are moral warrants the only defeasible a priori 
warrants? Not every statement knowable a priori is knowable immediately or self-evidently. Is 
the reliability of some defeasible a priori warrants also not recognizable immediately or self-
evidently? We answer these questions in the next two sections. 
 
2. Are there defeasible a priori warrants which do not correspond to rules of moral 
supervenience? 
 
I believe we can identify at least three types of a priori warrants which are not moral warrants, 
those backed by the rule “Treat like cases like,” those backed by the prime principle of 
confirmation, and those illustrating inference to best explanation. The rule covers a whole class 
of warrants. The rule more accurately should read “Treat relevantly like cases like.” This rule 
backs the warrants in what Govier in (1987), (1999) and (2012) calls and Wisdom in (1991) calls 
case-by-case reasoning.  Consider some vague concept. There is a range of indefiniteness where 
common usage does not determine whether or not the concept applies, at least not in all cases. 
However, there may be paradigm examples of the concept. Comparing the paradigms with a 
questionable element may let one decide whether the concept should apply to that element. Is an 
animal that does not fly still a bird? The answer may be settled by examining one or more 
creatures that all will agree are birds. What points of similarity does the questionable creature 
share with the paradigms? The comparison may be more or less naive. Kornblith in (1993) points 
out that some concepts are more central than others in determining whether an object properly 
falls into a given class. For example, two animals may be like in color of fur. By contrast, two 
animals may be like in mode of reproduction or nutrition, which are more essential attributes. 
Two animals with the same color but with different modes of nutrition or reproduction might be 
classed differently, while two animals of different color but the same modes of nutrition and 
reproduction may be classed alike. The attributes must be relevant. As scientific knowledge 
grows and deepens, our understanding of the class defining properties or central attributes of a 
given class, in particular of a given natural kind, may deepen, allowing us to define the class 
according to its more central, dare we say “essential,” attributes which may give us a more 
precise understanding of the class. Our use of scare quotes around “essential” may be 
unnecessary. Kornblith in (1993) quotes the psychologist Douglas Medin: “People act as if 
things (e.g., objects) have essences or underlying natures that make them the things they are” 
(Quoted in Kornblith, 70). This is psychological essentialism, which “may describe an innate 
feature of our conceptual structure” (Kornblith, p. 71). The notion of an essence then may not be 
just figurative. 
 Our recognition that concepts are essential need not be a priori. Some natural kinds may be 
characterized by observable properties. Where scientific knowledge is involved, recognizing the 
essential properties may apply scientific theory. What is backed a priori is the warrant 
 
 From: P1p & ... & Pn.p & Qp & P1e & ... & Pne 
 To infer ceteris paribus: Qe 
 
where ‘p’ denotes the paradigm and ‘e’ the element. We are not here arguing that because one or 
more paradigms all sharing the same properties are in a given class that a further object sharing 
these properties is also a member of the class, as we would in reasoning by inductive analogy. 
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Rather we are arguing from the likeness from the element to the paradigm that the element has 
some further property of the paradigm, which may be class membership. As Govier points out in 
(1987, 57), from the paradigm we have made a decision about the meaning of the class term. The 
paradigm then is indisputably a member of the class. Comparison of the object in the range of 
indefiniteness with the paradigm showed that it also has the defining properties. Treating like 
cases like, we count this object also in the class. The principle constitutes the a priori backing. 
Clearly likeness need not be likeness of morally relevant properties. We may have legally 
relevant likeness, physically relevant likeness, personally relevant likeness. If a paradigm 
displays a certain disposition, we may argue that a further element has that disposition from the 
premises that the two share properties relevant to attributing that disposition. Further whether a 
term properly applies in a given case is not simply a matter of how that term was applied in the 
past. For example, new scientific discoveries may case doubt on how a term may be applied. In 
light of modern physics, are there any objects which are truly solid? Past use of “solid” does not 
decide the question. 
 We may recognize two further patterns of non-normative argument with defeasible warrants 
backed a priori. In (Freeman, 2013b), we discussed warrants backed by the prime principle of 
confirmation. If the probability of an observation O is greater on H1 than on H2, then O gives 
greater support to H1 than to H2 (Compare Sober, p. 100). Hence, if the observation O actually 
occurs, we have a prima facie case for concluding to  H1. Expressed as a warrant, we have  
  From: O & Pr(O/ H1) > Pr(O/H2) 
   To infer ceteris paribus: H1 
 
(Freeman, 2013b, p. 191). This warrant is clearly defeasible. There may be a further hypothesis 
H3, perhaps not recognized, where Pr(O/H3) > Pr(O/H1). Does the prime principle of 
confirmation back the warrant a priori? What is the status of the principle? Sober points out that 
its acceptability is a matter of debate (Sober, 100), but he takes the principle as a given. That is a 
vote for its a priori status. It does not appeal to any a posteriori evidence for the principle. In 
addition to these considerations, Collins in (1999) points out an additional plausible source of 
support for the principle. It seems plausible to try to derive it from the axioms of probability 
theory. But that is a mathematical and thus a priori theory. We submit then the warrant based on 
the prime principle of confirmation is defeasible a priori. 
 
 Consider the pattern of reasoning to best explanation: 
  From: 1. Event E has occurred. 
   2. If H1 were the case, E would be the case. 
   3. H1 is the best available explanation for E. 
  To infer ceteris paribus: H1 
 
This warrant is obviously defeasible. H1 may be the best available explanation but H1 still may 
not be true. An alternative, incompatible, and heretofore unrecognized hypothesis may give a 
better explanation. To give a complete argument that this scheme is a priori requires explaining 
what “best available explanation” means, which is beyond the scope of this paper. But intuitive 
motivation is straightforward. What evidence would one seek to back the inference from (1), (2), 
(3) to the conclusion? Can one not see that if H1 explains an event E and is the best available 
explanation for E that there is a presumption for H1 until or unless some better explanation 
comes along? 
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 We rest our case that there are defeasible warrants backed a priori. Most of these warrants 
licence inferences to normative conclusions. We shall be concerned exclusively with such 
warrants, specifically warrants licencing conclusions of goodness, rightness, or related concepts, 
in the remainder of this paper. We turn now to the second of the two questions asked at the end 
of section 1. Is self-evidence the only evidence for these warrants backed a priori? 
 
 3. Can some defeasible a priori warrants be backed other than by self-evidence? 
 
This question is straightforward and applies even to conclusive a priori warrants. Not every 
logically true proposition is self-evident or a matter of logical intuition. To recognize their 
necessity, we may need to deduce then from those whose self-evidence is more obvious or by 
means of more obvious inference rules (e.g., conditional proof). Some defeasible a priori 
warrants are also backed by further evidence or considerations. Recall that warrants are general, 
being formulated with free variables (and perhaps schematic letters). Hence there corresponds to 
a warrant a universally quantified conditional. As Rescher indicates in (1977, 14), we may prefix 
a universal statement with an object language ceteris paribus operator ‘@’. Hence to the warrant 
 
  From: Px 
  To infer ceteris paribus: Qx 
 
corresponds “@(x)(Px ⊃ Qx).” An argument for the corresponding general statement of the 
warrant is, in effect, an argument for the warrant. Hence, if a warrant is not backed by intuitive 
self-evidence, one who accepts the warrant may attempt to back it by arguing for its 
corresponding universal statement. 
 One may immediately ask “If the warrant is defeasible, how does one argue for the 
universally quantified statement qualified by the ‘@’ operator. Rescher has made suggestive 
comments in (1976, p. 61), but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that 
at least one of the premises of an argument will have an ‘@’ universal statement which itself is 
either self-evident or supported by a further argument with at least one ‘@’ universal premise, 
until we reach the basic premises. If the argument is to be successful, at least one of these basic 
premises must be intuitively self-evident. Hence while a moral warrant which is self-evident is 
backed immediately by moral intuition, a warrant whose corresponding universal generalization 
is the conclusion of an argument is mediately backed by intuition. 
 For moral warrants, appeal to higher level moral principles provides a further type of 
backing. To distinguish higher level principles from first order principles contrast  
 
1. All things being equal, an act of escaping from prison is wrong.     
  with 
2. A state’s being tyrannical or its rulers being tyrants is the only justification for acting 
against the state.       
 
While a first level principle asserts a judgment about a particular class of actions, a higher-level 
principle asserts a judgment about a class or classes of actions. Actions against a state or 
rebellion or revolt against a state are not specific acts but include a whole class of actions. 
Rebelling against a state may take a number of forms. The higher-level moral principle concerns 
actions in any of these classes. Higher level moral principles, like basic level principles, are also 
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cognized by moral intuition. Sidgwick as reported by Cohen in (1986, pp. 80-81) has 
distinguished dogmatic from philosophical intuition. Dogmatic intuition concerns general rules 
while philosophical intuition concerns fundamental principles, the foundations of a system of 
ethics and perhaps more generally a system of values. For example, it may express a philosophy 
of right as opposed to characterizing a specific type of action as right. One immediately thinks of 
Aristotle’s principle of the mean, Kant’s categorical imperative, and Mill’s principle of 
utilitarianism.  
 How then does philosophical intuition work? Sidgwick holds that although we have 
intuitions of general principles, resting simply with the body of these moral rules “is often found 
unsatisfactory as a system” (Sidgwick, p. 102). Even when carefully formulated to be consistent 
and complete in answering all practical moral questions, “the resulting code seems an accidental 
aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some rational synthesis” (Sidgwick, p. 102). The 
philosophical question of what makes right acts right (and similarly for the other values) remains 
unanswered. Philosophical intuitionism sees a small number of principles “more absolutely and 
undeniably true an evident, from which these current rules [i.e., the body of general principles] 
might be deduced” (Sidgick, p. 102). How does one get from the philosophically intuited higher- 
level principles to special general principles? Sidgwick has not addressed this question, but 
examining two paradigms of the operation of philosophical intuition is illuminating. Consider 
Kant’s categorical imperative: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that 
my maxim should be a universal law” (Paton, 1948, p. 70, italics in original). Kant immediately 
presents an example of a non-universally generalizable maxim. Is it permissible to make a false 
promise to avoid significant negative consequences to oneself? Suppose that it is permissible, at 
least in some circumstances. Let us see if we can cast this example in a Toulminian framework. 
The maxim corresponds to 
 
From: I am promising to do A and I have no intention of doing A and my              
promising to do A lets me avoid negative consequences to myself 
 To infer: My promising to do A is morally permissible 
 
Clearly, there is nothing special about me which would allow me to restrict this maxim just to my 
case. For proper generality then I should state the warrant this way: 
 
 From: x promised  to do A and x has no intention of doing A and x’s promising               
to do A lets x avoid negative consequences to x 
  To infer: x’s promising to do A is morally permissible 
 
 Kant asks whether one can will that everyone makes false promises when convenient, i.e. can 
one will that everyone act according to the above maxim? He argues that one clearly cannot. In 
fact, universalizing the maxim would annul the practice of promise making and thus be self-
stultifying. 
 
Could I really say to myself that every one may make a false promise if he finds 
himself in a difficulty from which he can extricate himself in no other way? I then 
become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a 
universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all, 
since it would be futile to profess a will for future action to others who would not 
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believe my profession or who, if they did so over-hastily, would pay me back in like 
coin. (Paton, p. 403. The reference refers to the marginal pagination in Paton)  
 
The universalization of a maxim incompatible with the categorical imperative here leads to a 
contradiction. But promise breaking is just one of the myriad types of actions whose maxim is 
self-stultifying. The individual maxims enjoining from performing such actions are all 
systematized by the categorical imperative. But the implication backs the warrant corresponding 
to the maxim.  
 Mill’s moral and political philosophy also includes higher-level principles. His Utilitarianism 
presents the “greatest happiness principle as the foundation of morals: “Actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, privation 
of pleasure” (Mill 1957, p. 10).  Mill devotes significant effort to explain what he sees happiness 
and unhappiness involving, and dispelling misconceptions. These are not our issues here. Rather, 
how may the greatest happiness principle back warrants (or support their corresponding universal 
generalizations) given an unanalyzed but common sense understanding of happiness? Consider 
 
  From: x is a person distinct from a person y 
  To infer ceteris paribus: x has a duty not to damage y’s property 
or   To infer ceteris paribus: y’s damaging x’s property is wrong 
 
For Ross (Ross, p. 21), this warrant expresses a duty of non-maleficence recognized by moral 
intuition. But what of Mill’s higher level happiness principle? Arguably one’s damaging 
someone else’s property decreases the overall amount of happiness. Recognizing this connection 
is sufficient to see that the happiness principle backs the basic level warrant. It is a prima facie 
convergent source of backing for the warrant. But why is the happiness principle a proper source 
of backing? Does it not offer an explanation of why the duty of non-maleficience is a duty? Does 
it not, as Sidgwick indicates about principles recognized by philosophic intuition, find for [the 
morality of common sense] a philosophic basis which [common sense] does not itself offer: to 
get one or more principles more absolutely true and evident?” (Sidgwick, p. 102) 
 This two level view of backing has further implications for the strength of backing. If a 
higher level principle agrees with a first level principle corresponding to a warrant, in the sense 
that what the first level principle sanctions, the higher level principle sanctions, the backing for 
the warrant and our confidence in its reliability is increased. Likewise, the agreement of first 
level principles with a higher-level principle reinforces our confidence in the higher level 
principle. Further, we may be less then confident about some of our first level principles. But 
should these principles agree with higher-level principles in which we are confident to some 
degree, our confidence in the first level principle is increased. However, first-level and higher- 
level princples need not agree. In such cases, we may adjust both our higher level and first level 
principles. As Rawls puts it, we can go back and forth, sometimes revising principles and at 
other times reconsidering our judgments “and conforming them to principles” (Rails, p. 20). In 
the end, we shall have principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and 
adjusted”–reflective equilibrium” (Rawls, p. 20). Rawls points out that the end may not be the 
ultimate end. “Particular cases ... may lead us to revise our judgments (Rawls, p. 21).” Reflective 
equilibrium is “reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and ... has 
either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his original convictions 
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(and their corresponding conception) (Rawls, p. 48).” If moral warrants may be backed by moral 
intuition and also by higher level principles, they may be backed by both, in particular if the 
backing has been refined by reflective equilibrium. 
 As we have seen, higher-level principles may be the product of philosophical intuition. 
Hence either perceptual or philosophical intuition or both are involved backing moral warrants.  
But are intuitions objective? Can one person’s intuitions conflict with another’s at least in some 
instances and can this disagreement be resolved by appeal to evidence and reason? If a priori 
defeasible warrants are backed by intuitions, does their backing give them any objective status? 
Does it constitute any objective evidence for their “authority and currency”? If not, does it make 
any sense to say that an argument instancing one warrant has a stronger objective connection 
between its premise and conclusion than another with same premise and conclusion instancing a 
different warrant? The next section addresses this question directly. 
 
4. Diversity of opinion over defeasible a priori warrants, the challenge of relativism, and the 
objectivist response 
 
That there is a wide diversity of opinion across cultures over moral norms and codes, and thus 
also moral warrants, is common knowledge, and has also been widely documented by cultural 
anthropologists. Ruth Benedict points out that certain behaviors and the persons who behave in 
these ways are regarded as abnormal in some cultures, but are perfectly acceptable in others 
where these persons can function successfully. For example, homophobia prevails in some 
cultures while in others homosexuals may be treated with honor. Cooperation may be a 
cornerstone of social interaction in one society, but may be regarded as contemptible in another. 
Benedict concludes, “The vast majority of individuals in any group are shaped to the fashion of 
that culture. ... The small proportion of the number of deviants in any culture is not a function of 
the sure instinct with which society has built itself upon the fundamental sanities, but of the 
universal fact that, happily, the majority of mankind quite readily take any shape that is 
presented to them” (Benedict, 1934). Benedict draws this conclusion: “Normality is culturally 
defined. ... Every society, beginning with some slight inclination in one direction or another, 
carries its preference farther and farther, integrating itself more and more completely upon its 
chosen basis, and discarding those types of behavior that are uncongenial” (Benedict, 1934). 
There is no objective apprehension of any moral value upon which a society’s beliefs are based. 
(Benedict, 1934). In morals, a practice comes first, which is then recognized as normal, and then 
as right. Practice precedes norms. Moral relativism is also endorsed by some philosophers. 
Mackie in (1977) says, “Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to 
and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way 
round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of 
life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of 
monogamy” (Mackie, reprinted in Shafer-Landau 2018, p. 183). 
 Is moral relativism the only viable position, given the facts the relativists present? Is the 
claim correct that moral codes have developed from behaviors which have been socially 
accepted absent any epistemic discerning of their rightness? Some philosophers have taken up 
the challenge of moral relativism. Rachels counters that the inference from the premise that 
different cultures have different moral codes to the conclusion that there is no objective truth in 
morality is fallacious (Rachels, p. 372). The premise concerns beliefs humans entertain. The 
conclusion concerns whether what they believe has any objective truth value. It is like arguing 
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that while most people reject the Flat Earth Hypothesis while some accept it, we cannot speak of 
the truth or falsity of the Flat Earth Hypothesis. Disagreement may rather mean that one side is 
mistaken, not that there is no truth to the matter. Further, as Rachels points out, one may give a 
reductio ad absurdum argument against moral relativism. Assume the relativist claim holds. 
Then if a society practices genocide, or female genital mutilation, or abduction and murder of 
members of the society who dissent from some majority view, the society is not open to moral 
criticism on these grounds. Claims that something is right or wrong are descriptive statements, 
true or false according to empirically ascertainable public opinion. A society which eliminates 
the subjugation of women has shown no moral progress.  Where is the transcultural standpoint 
allowing us to judge that a change in a society’s social practices constitutes moral reform? 
Rachels has made his point. If cultural relativism has these consequences, it is not acceptable. 
However, relativists have an easy rejoinder to this argument. Bite the bullet! The argument only 
refutes relativism if we agree that the consequences are objectively intrinsically bad. As 
relativists we refuse to concede that point. It judges other cultures by the standards of our own, 
which are just our standards, which are no more objective than the standards of a society 
tolerating the behavior you call bad. Your argument begs the question. 
 But does it? What is needed is an argument for the objectivity of some value judgments. 
Constructing such an argument is straightforward. 
 
(Premise) Living in society has necessary conditions, specifically it is necessary for those 
living in the society to constrain their behavior within certain limits. Therefore 
 (Conclusion) Rules requiring behavior to respect these limits are objectively right. 
 
The premise seems simply a matter of common sense. To live together in society requires a level 
of cooperation and trust to any significant degree. If the members of that society are free to kill 
each other, steal from each other, or tell blatant lies to each other, how could such a society 
achieve the technological, artistic, or political accomplishments which are the fruits of human 
cooperation? At best, it would be a society lacking many human goods. We can put the premise 
more broadly: Human life has certain existential requirements. Hence states of affairs which 
foster satisfying these requirements are objectively good, and actions that contribute to or 
advance satisfying these requirements are objectively right. Rachels states this point quite 
succinctly: “There are some moral rules that all societies have in common, because those rules 
are necessary for society to exist” (Rachels, p. 376, italics omitted). If a rule is existentially 
necessary, then an action that accords with rule is objectively right. 
 We may develop a similar understanding of what makes a good state of affairs objectively 
good. In (1988), Boyd defends moral realism. Moral statements are either true or false, at least 
approximately, independently of any prevailing moral opinion. He asks us to consider scientific 
realism, “the doctrine that the methods of science are capable of providing (partial or 
approximate) knowledge of unobservable (“theoretical”) entities ... in addition to knowledge 
about the behavior of observable phenomena” (Boyd, p. 188). This realistic stance not only gives 
scientists a rationale for refining measurement and detection procedures for theoretical entities in 
light of developments in scientific theory (Boyd, p. 188), but fosters defining scientific terms–
including redefining currently used terms, for example for natural kinds–in terms of underlying 
theoretical entities and their behavior. Such definitions are not limited to those which give 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Ordinary language philosophers have called attention to 
property-cluster definitions where a term is defined by a collection of properties “such that the 
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possession of an adequate number of the properties is sufficient for falling within the extension 
of the term” (Boyd, 196). Boyd identifies one type of property-cluster, which he calls a 
‘homeostatic property cluster,’ as having special importance. Here not only do the properties 
“co-occur in an important number of cases,” (Boyd, p. 197), this co-occurrence is not an accident 
or simply a statistical fact. There is either a law-like connection (albeit not universal) between 
the presence of some properties in the cluster or an underlying mechanism underlying the co-
presence of the properties (Boyd, p. 197). For this reason, Boyd describes them as homeostatic, 
although this may be a metaphorical use of the term (Boyd, p. 197). Where most of the properties 
in the cluster are satisfied by the members of a class c, a kind term t may be applied to that class 
and “All or part of the homeostatic cluster F together with some or all of the mechanisms which 
underlie it provides the natural definition of t” (Boyd, p. 197).  
 What does all this have to do with showing that despite the cultural diversity of moral 
opinions, some moral judgments are objectively true or at least approximately true and that 
moral realism is a viable position against the claims of moral relativism? The concept of a 
homeostatic property cluster motivates the concept of homeostatic consequentialism. Boyd 
identifies certain goods, those which satisfy important human needs, either physical or 
psychological and social. Surely calling them goods is a totally straightforward position. One can 
easily adapt Ross’s words about promises: “To me it seems as self-evident as anything could be” 
that to satisfy an important human need is to be a human good; certainly a prima facie good.” 
Clearly also among the important human needs are the existential needs of preserving human 
life, either of the individual or of the species. Frequently these good are homeostatically 
clustered and further conditions may enhance the homeostasis. Further, “Moral goodness is 
defined by this cluster of goods and the homeostatic mechanisms which unify them” (Boyd, p. 
203). Hence, the homeostatic nature of good gives us a theory: “Actions, policies, character 
traits, etc. are morally good to the extent to which they tend to foster the realization of these 
goods or to develop and sustain the homeostatic mechanisms upon which their unity depends” 
(Boyd, p. 203). 
 Given this understanding of moral goodness, Boyd proceeds to defend his view that 
affirming moral goodness as a real property and moral judgments as objective is plausible. He 
compares moral knowledge to scientific knowledge. His argument for moral realism may then be 
parallel to an argument for scientific realism. Empirical science is based on observation–
perceptual observation. Likewise moral knowledge is based on observation, but including much 
more than perceptual observation. In addition it includes self-observation, introspection, “trained 
judgment and the operation of sympathy” (Boyd, p. 206). The mention of sympathy connects 
Boyd’s view with the moral sense theory in moral philosophy. He stresses the importance of 
sympathy for moral objectivity. It is the “capacity to imagine [oneself] in the situation of others” 
(Boyd, p. 215). But imagining the situation of others can be more or less accurate to their 
situation. Hence sympathy has a cognitive dimension. It also has a motivational role, “to make 
moral facts motivationally relevant” (Boyd, p. 216). What may we make of a person who viewed 
a horrific situation, yet was moved in no way of any sort? Boyd holds that this person not only 
has a motivational deficiency but a cognitive deficiency as well. The person cannot assess moral 
facts correctly. Boyd is confident that “the full resources of naturalistic epistemology” would 
complete the argument that reacting to a situation with sympathy is both motivational and 
cognitive. If that claim is plausible, we have a further reason for the objectivity of moral 
judgments. 
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 As in science, observations are theory dependent. Boyd argues that this dependence, 
however, does not necessarily render the observations theory relative, not true to the way things 
are without qualification but only relative to the theories on which they depend, and exclude their 
being part of a case for moral realism. Likewise, that observations in science are theory-
dependent does not render them theory relative. This view does not imply anti-realism. Rather, 
observations will be “sufficiently reliable for the defense of moral realism just in case we are 
able to portray the theories upon which they are their interpretation depends as relevantly 
approximately true” (Boyd, p. 207). The criterion for making this assessment concerns our 
background moral beliefs. Have they been close enough to the truth to “form the basis for 
subsequent improvement of moral knowledge in the light of further experience and further 
historical developments” (Boyd, p. 207)? Given new evidence, have our existing beliefs about 
human needs, capacities, and goods been reliable enough to allow the growth of moral 
knowledge even if this growth involved a process of revision for moral beliefs through reflective 
equilibrium? Does such progress seem observable? Does the abolition of slavery and the fruits of 
the still unfinished struggle for racial justice constitute evidence of moral improvement? Should 
the relativist claim they do not, he or she is apparently denying observable moral facts. Boyd 
continues that beside moral observations, our moral intuition also possesses a degree of 
reliability. Like scientific intuitions, they are “a species of trained judgment” (Boyd, p. 207). 
“Moral intuitions, like physical intuitions, play a limited but legitimate role in empirical inquiry 
precisely because they are linked to theory and to observation in a generally reliable process of 
reflective equilibrium” (Boyd, p. 208, italics in original). 
 Boyd’s point here is extremely crucial for the overall project of this paper. In the next section 
we shall discuss the comparative strength of moral warrants and the question of when a warrant 
is strong enough to transfer the acceptability of the premises in a moral argument to the 
conclusion. Recall Cohen’s characterization of intuition in (1986, p. 73) as concerning  what may 
be inferred from what. If a warrant licencing us to infer from a morally relevant premise to a 
moral conclusion is backed by moral intuition together with specific moral observations and  
moral theory, there should be a presumption of at least reliability for that warrant. If there were 
no objective moral considerations, what sense would it make to compare the strength of warrants 
and thus of the arguments which instance them? At base, would not a moral warrant then express 
nothing more than a subjective opinion and the concept of its strength constitute objectively 
nothing more then an illusion? By contrast, if corresponding to a warrant is a general moral 
statement for which one has objective evidence making the statement acceptable, then the 
question of the objective strength of the warrant makes sense. 
 
5. Rebuttals and the comparative strength of defeasible a priori warrants 
 
 Defeasible warrants may be defeated or rebutted. For example, the warrant 
 
  From: Px 
  To infer ceteris paribus Qx 
 
May not be reliable if some further property  x is conjoined to the premise. Consider 
 
  From: x’s taking x’s neighbor’s boat without permission 
  To infer ceteris paribus: x’s action was wrong 
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Our moral intuition vouches for the reliability of this warrant. But suppose x is acting in an 
emergency situation–someone is drowning, x is the only other person around, and x’s taking the 
boat lets x save that person. Now consider 
 
From: x is taking x’s neighbor’s boat without permission allowed x to save a 
drowning person’s life 
  To infer ceteris paribus x’s action was morally wrong 
 
Many will disagree that this is a reliable warrant. The added condition rebuts the inference to 
wrongness. 
 At the level of basic principles, moral intuition may recognize the prima facie reliability of 
the inference or the effectiveness of the rebuttal to defeat the inference. Likewise, a higher-level 
principle may back the warrant. Furthermore, since reflective equilibrium may require the mutual 
adjustment of basic and higher-level principles, the adjusting conditions may be viewed as 
rebuttals to the unmodified warrant. As Cohen points out in (1970), the number of rebuttals for 
moral warrants varies. For some classes of actions, there may be few rebutting conditions, while 
for others there may be more. There are few exceptions to the wrongness of betraying one’s 
country while there may be a number of situations where breaking a promise is justifiable. As 
with empirical or legal warrants, the strength of moral warrants varies inversely with the number 
of rebuttals that may be brought against them. This is a first approximation. We must now spell 
out how we may identify the potential rebuttals for a given moral warrant and which rebuttals 
actually defeat it. Let us recall that warrants are general. Assuming the only warrants we need to 
consider for discussion in this paper are licences to go from one first order property to another, 
warrants will display the form 
 
  From: Px1 ... xn 
  To infer ceteris paribus Qx1 ... xn 
  
So far, we have been using “moral warrant” generically to include warrants licencing inferences 
to statements of intrinsic, deontic, or aretaic value. We may identify classes of these values. We 
may classify deontic warrants according to Ross’s classes or prima facie duties, although he did 
not regard his enumeration as complete. In (Freeman, 2005, 245), we identified ten: beneficence, 
non-maleficence, reparation, equity, reprocity, impartiality, self-improvement, self-respect, 
explicit fidelity (keeping promises), and implicit fidelity (not telling lies). With each of these 
prima facie duties, we may associate a class of warrants licencing our inferring some attribute of 
moral obligation from some morally relevant attribute. Consider beneficence. Ross defines a 
duty of beneficence as resting “on the mere fact that there are other beings in the world whose 
condition we can make better in respect of virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure” (Ross, p. 21). 
For example, 
 
  From: x’s contributing a sum of money y to educational institution z will help insure 
educational opportunities for all members of a given class of students. 
  To infer ceteris paribus: x has a duty to contribute y to z 
We can imagine a plethora of situations that might rebut such a duty of beneficence. x might not 
owe that sum y to z by virtue of a valid contract with w, where w and z are distinct, or by virtue 
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of an explicit promise made to another institution, or by virtue of z’s racist policies in 
admissions, or for a host of other reasons. A duty of beneficence is not a duty to perform some 
specific act. Rather it is a duty to perform an act of a certain sort. By contrast, consider 
reparation, a duty “resting on a previous wrongful act” (Ross, p. 21).  
 
From: Company x’s careless work did $y in damages to z’s house  
  To infer ceteris paribus x owes z at least $y 
 
It is not at all obvious what condition would relieve Company x of its duty to make good on the 
$y. Clearly, we should also be able to imagine rebuttals associated with Ross’s other prima facie 
duties. 
 The point is this: Suppose the premise of a warrant attributes some morally relevant property 
to an action. (Of course, it may attribute a relation to a plurality of actions.) By identifying the 
class to which the warrant of this argument belongs, we have a list of potential rebuttals which  
may possibly defeat the warrant. From the simple assertion of the attribute, we do not know 
whether any of these rebuttals hold. The more rebuttals that may hold, the more grounds on 
which to defeat the warrant, and thus the weaker the case ascribing the attribute makes for the 
normative conclusion. (As we shall see shortly, this condition is an approximation and needs to 
be qualified in terms of plausibility considerations.) 
 
 As we have seen, the argument 
  From: James returned John’s gun as promised. 
  To infer ceteris paribus: James acted rightly toward John. 
 
will certainly be rebutted if John shows signs of mental instability. But suppose we had 
information from a reputable source (it could be our own observation) that John’s behavior and 
demeanor showed no signs of emotional distress. That is, we are justified in accepting that John 
was under no emotional distress when James returned the rifle to him. The rebuttal is countered. 
Adding this information to the premise strengthens the argument. The warrant for the extended 
argument 
 
  From:   x returned y’s gun as promised and y displayed no signs                                  
of mental instability 
  To infer ceteris paribus: x acted rightly in returning y’s gun 
 
is stronger than the warrant of the original argument just because there is one fewer way to rebut 
the warrant. The fewer the rebuttals available to defeat the warrant, the stronger the warrant will 
be. In general, then, to a given a deontic warrant, we may conjoin to the premise of the warrant 
one or more predicates expressing counter rebuttals to recognized rebuttals for the argument. The 
resulting expanded warrant is stronger than the original warrant for the argument just because it 
cannot be defeated by the countered rebuttals.  
 
 
Schematically where “~R1x, ..., ~Rnx” express the properties that rebuttals R1 , ..., Rn do not 
hold, 
  From: Px & ~R1x & ... & ~Rnx 
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  To infer ceteris paribus Qx 
 is a stronger warrant than just 
  From: Px 
  To infer ceteris paribus Qx 
 
The warrant licencing inferring Qx from the premise of the expanded warrant has survived these 
rebuttals. 
 Would it be right to say that the more rebuttals survived, the stronger the warrant? That 
would be hasty at this point. It may be plausible, even highly plausible, that a certain rebuttal 
might hold, while another rebuttal’s holding might be far less plausible. Suppose Sam is very 
kind to his elderly grandmother. She has many infirmities consistent with age and needs 
assistance. Sam can readily render such assistance and invariably does so.  Prima facie Sam is a 
paragon of beneficence. If we argue from the fact of Sam’s beneficent behavior to his acting 
rightly towards his grandmother, we should be arguing according to the warrant: 
 
  From: x consistently assists y and y needs assistance 
  To infer ceteris paribus x is acting in a morally good way toward y 
 
But suppose Sam’s grandmother is wealthy and Sam frequently tells her that his means are 
modest and an inheritance could help him, although there are other persons who could also be 
regarded as legitimate heirs. Would we still conclude that Sam is acting in a morally good way 
toward his grandmother? Consider the warrant 
 
 From: x is consistently assisting y & y needs assistance & x is frequently telling y 
that x could be helped by inheriting a share of y’s estate 
  To infer ceteris paribus x is acting in a morally good way toward y 
 
The warrant conjoins a rebuttal to the initial premise. In its light, we might reconsider the 
conclusion of the argument. But how plausible is it that Sam is trying to manipulate his 
grandmother by what he is telling her? If we knew that, our moral evaluation of Sam’s behavior 
would be different. But we do not have this information at present. Furthermore, might there be 
exonerating conditions which would leave Sam’s behavior morally acceptable? Could Sam be 
trying to preserve her estate (some of it at least) from heirs who would squander her shares?  
Even with the rebuttal, the conclusion seems acceptable in light of the premises. We say that the 
warrant has resisted the rebuttal in this case. 
 By contrast, consider this scenario. Sam is again acting very beneficently toward his 
grandmother. However, he intends to slip deadly poison into the medications he helps his 
grandmother to take. Given the information that Sam is acting beneficently toward his 
grandmother but nonetheless is trying to murder her, can we accept the conclusion that Sam’s 
action is morally good? Are there exculpating factors in this situation which would allow us to 
still hold that Sam’s behavior is morally good because of his beneficence? One at least is 
arguable. Suppose the grandmother is in serious pain and is debilitated. His killing is a mercy 
killing. In the second argument, the warrant also survives. But do both arguments have the same 
strength? Is it far more plausible that we could find an exonerating condition for putting gentle 
pressure on the grandmother than for finding an exonerating condition for murdering her? Both 
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arguments resist one rebuttal. But the strength of the second is distinctly greater than the strength 
of the first. 
    As we have developed in (2018a), (2018b), and (2019) for arguments with warrants backed a 
posteriori, to compare warrants for strength, we need first to identify potential rebuttals for a 
given warrant and then to rank those rebuttals for plausibility, from most plausible (or none more 
plausible, if there are several warrants of maximal plausibility) to minimal plausibility. Let us 
assume for simplicity’s sake that no two rebuttals have the sane plausibility. Let us also assume 
that in any given case the number of potential rebuttals is finite. Adultery is a violation of a 
promise and thus of a duty of fidelity. So is not keeping an appointment to meet someone at a 
given time. Consider: 
 
  From: x committed adultery against y 
  To infer ceteris paribus x wronged y 
 
Under what circumstances might the breach of some duty of fidelity be repaired, the wrong made 
right? An apology might be effective in some cases. Perhaps a better remedy is bringing a peace 
offering. But what peace offering would make right the wrong done in adultery? Assume, for the 
sake of argument that no compensation is effective. Our warrant resists all rebuttals that could be 
brought against warrants backed by duties of fidelity. 
 
 Now contrast the warrant 
  From: x failed to meet y as promised 
  To infer ceteris paribus: x wronged y 
 
Depending on the circumstances, there may be a number of conceivable ways for x to make the situation right. Assume we can 
order these ways according to their plausibility for making the situation right. Suppose a really 
big box of chocolates is the most plausible. Suppose that x has tried this remedy but it did not 
work. x has still wronged y (or y considers this of x’s behavior). So the warrant has resisted the 
first rebuttal. We may express this strength by a ratio. Where n is the number of rebuttals that can 
be brought against a warrant of a given type (e.g., a warrant backed by proper evidence for a 
duty of fairness) and m is the number of rebuttals resisted in an attempt to find rebuttals against 
the warrant when the rebuttals are properly ordered, we express the strength by m/n. If the 
chocolates by themselves will not work, the warrant has a strength of at least 1/n. Assume that 
giving roses is the second rebuttal on the list. By itself it is less plausible than the chocolates. But 
what about chocolates and roses? Will they together bring about reconciliation? Assume the 
evidence is negative. The warrant now has strength 2/n. But will chocolates, roses, and tickets to 
a Broadway show do the trick? That does it. The warrant has strength 3/n. We need to consider 
that before we consider some further rebuttal.  Hence, given our ordering of the rebuttals 
according to decreasing plausibility of effectiveness, a warrant with strength m/n is weaker than 
a warrant with strength m+k/n, where k > 0. If a warrant resists no rebuttals, its strength is 0/n. If 
it resists all rebuttals, its strength is n/n = 1. If were dealing with warrants backed a posteriori by 
a body of perceptually observed evidence, Cohen would call their corresponding generalizations 
laws of nature. If the generalization is supported by intuition or principles in reflective 
equilibrium, we might say that it is a moral absolute. We might expect the generalization of the 
warrant from adultery to morally wrong behavior to have this strength, which will also be the 
strength of the warrant. However, we may prefer to say “ceteris paribus,” since there may be 
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further rebuttals not recognized by us which, if they were included in our enumeration, might not 
be rebutted. 
  Recall that we may classify deontic warrants according to our list of prima facie duties in 
(Freeman, 2005, 245) derived from Ross. Given our classification, we have warrants of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, reparation, equity, reciprocity or gratitude, sympathy, self-
improvement, self-respect, explicit fidelity or promise keeping, and implicit fidelity or not telling 
lies. With each class of warrants we may associate a class of rebuttals. Given two rebuttals of the 
same class, the stronger is the one which resists more rebuttals. May we compare rebuttals of 
different classes for strength? This will be possible, if there is overlap of rebuttals for the two 
classes. Killing is an act of maleficence while telling lies is a breach of fidelity. But, as Cohen 
points out in (1970, 176), “The wrongness of killing ... may be thought more important than the 
wrongness of telling a lie, insofar as all circumstances that are exceptional for the former (war, 
self-defense, etc.) are also exceptional for the latter, while may exceptional circumstanced for the 
latter (arising out of politeness, kindness, etc.) are not exceptional for the former.” We can 
compare the stringency of killing with that of telling lies because there are rebuttals which apply 
to either class. 
  We have, of course, here treated comparative strength for only one type of defeasible a priori 
warrant, those dealing with deontic value. But we may have warrants licencing inferences to 
statements of intrinsic or aretaic value, non-moral goodness or moral goodness or virtue. In 
addition, as we have indicated, we may have defeasible a priori warrants not licencing inferences 
to a moral conclusion. What does strength mean for these latter warrants and may we compare 
them for strength? We must leave these questions for future discussions. 
  One question remains. Given that the premises of an argument are acceptable, when will a 
defeasible a priori warrant be strong enough to convey that acceptability to the conclusion? As 
we have just shown, the strength of a warrant is determined by the first rebuttal it does not resist. 
Thus, if rebuttal i+1 cannot be countered but none of 1   i, the strength of the warrant is i/n.  How 
do we find this point above which the warrant is rebuttal tolerant? We cannot present a recipe for 
identifying this point. Rather, we present the factors which both constitute connection adequacy 
and may be considered in reasoning about the connection adequacy of a given argument. Two 
quotations are apposite: 
 
This sense of a particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded and informed by the 
fullest reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it is the 
only guide we have to our duty. (Ross, 1930, p. 42) 
 
For any singular proposition S about the individual or individuals a1, a2, ... and an, accept S if 
and only if for some R you know that R states all the relevant evidence available about a1, a2, ... 
and an and [the strength of the argument “R therefore S” is greater than or equal to some k] 
where k has to be greater than zero but its more precise level is to be determined in accordance 
with the nature of the subject matter and the best available list of relevant variables for tests on 
generalizations about that subject matter. (Cohen, 1977, p. 319) 
 
 Consider an argument that a particular state of affairs a is intrinsically good. The premises of the 
argument assert properties of a upon which a’s goodness supervenes. Where P1x, ..., Pnx express 
these relevant properties and Gx expresses the property of intrinsic goodness, the argument looks 
like this: 
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 P1a, ..., Pna Therefore Ga 
 
Hence the warrant is 
 
  From: P1x, ..., Pnx  
  To infer ceteris paribus: Gx 
 
As we shall see shortly, it will be convenient to introduce the notation “1 ≤ i ≤ n” to express a 
conjunction of n conjuncts. The counterpart of Cohen’s “R” here involves such a conjunction. 
The first conjuncts constitute the conjunction of the premises of the argument, i.e, 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia. 
Let RV1, ..., RVm be “the best available list of relevant variables” bearing on the inference from   
1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia to Ga.  For some values of these relevant variables, the statement that the value holds 
of a constitutes no rebuttal of the move from 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia to Ga. The value is not negatively 
relevant evidence against Ga. Other values of the variable will be negatively relevant and 
constitute rebuttals. Let “RVi
jx x” express the predicate that x satisfies the jth value of relevant 
variable RVi. It is also possible that some, but only some of the values of Rvi are true of a. It is 
further possible that we may order the values of RVi which are true of a in order of decreasing 
plausibility for rebutting the argument. Hence we may lexicographically order all of the values of 
the relevant variables RVi., 1 ≤  n. Let R1a, R2a..., Rja be the statements expressing that a 
satisfies some value of some relevant variable, again arranged in order of decreasing plausibility. 
 Consider R1a. Does R1a rebut the argument from 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia to Ga, i.e. given that R1a holds, 
does Ga fail to hold even though 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia holds? In other words, given our sense of intrinsic 
goodness informed by reflective equilibrium, does Ga fail to hold in light of 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia & Ga . If 
yes, R1a rebuts the argument. The warrant does not transfer the acceptability of 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia to Ga. 
If no, consider R1a & R2a. Although it is less plausible that R2a rebuts the argument given our 
ordering of rebuttals, the conjunction may constitute a rebuttal. Does it? If yes, the argument is 
rebutted and the warrant does not transfer acceptability. If no, then consider R1a & R2a & R3a. 
Repeat this procedure until reaching a yes answer, say at the kth rebuttal in our ordering. Then 
k/n is the upper limit of the warrant’s rebuttal intolerance. None of the more plausibly effective 
values of a relevant variable actually rebuts the warrant of the argument and the argument 
successfully transfers the acceptability of 1 ≤ i ≤ n Pia to Ga. We have an answer to our final 
question. We can not only compare arguments with defeasible a priori warrants for strength, but 
have a method for answering the question of whether the connection licenced by the warrant of 
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